A number of these FIDO posts are cropping up and I still don't really get it. Someone in a previous one explained the benefits over and above my current password manager set up.
However you have articulated the single biggest problem with this, and that is you are not in control of this thing.
I'm activity not tying anything to a cloud identity, ever. And I'm not having multiple devices or multiple cloud identities for when Google's et. al. automated AI type system decides I'm not getting access to my stuff.
It seems to me a centralised single point of weakness open to exploitation from the multi national corps.
Fundamentally, there should be no need for a "cloud identity".
I have a couple Yubikeys, for example, and I can treat them like keys to my house. Somewhat different, in that I cannot make a copy as directly, but that's honestly a good thing. I just have most of my applications set up to accept at least two of these keys, and I store one as backup generally along with a file-based key as backup somewhere secure.
This is essentially what the cloud services should have on your account to "re-enroll" you, just self-managed.
I want to get to the point where I can treat my physical keychain's USB/NFC (though, call me old school, I really like the direct physical connection) key much like a car key. Even automatically locking my laptop when I remove it (or get too far away).
Agree on fundamentals - after all that's how it works now, you don't need FAANG for this.
I do suspect that until it works "by default" for most users (without requiring any explicit configuration, backup or maintenance) then adoption will remain low.
> I do suspect that until it works "by default" for most users (without requiring any explicit configuration, backup or maintenance) then adoption will remain low.
That is exactly what these recent announcements from the big platforms have been about.
Yep. That's why I always hope for layers of standards. Lower level standards to enable higher level standards eventually all the way up to your gramps.
Part of it is about avoiding the possibility of screwing up by eg picking poor passwords or giving your password to the wrong site or allowing replay attacks (though I guess tls mostly protects from that).
You don’t need to rely on cloud backups, though many users will. It is also usually possible to set up things like account recovery codes (which you print out and put somewhere safe) or TOTP auth (more useful if you eg aren’t able to carry a yubikey everywhere with you / can’t plug it into your phone).
> A number of these FIDO posts are cropping up and I still don't really get it. Someone in a previous one explained the benefits over and above my current password manager set up.
This post and the last one[0] are the same exact statement, this one was just posted again.
> It seems to me a centralised single point of weakness open to exploitation from the multi national corps.
IMO this is mostly a misunderstanding, the proposal is a commitment to implementing a host of features to make regular users actually consider using security keys:
- Apple and Google are implementing a syncing security key service, likely on top of their existing password manager infrastructure [iCloud Keychain[1,2] on Apple devices]
- They are also committing to wireless Webauthn-over-BLE technology, so you can do things like scanning a QR Code on your Windows desktop to sign in with a security key stored in your iCloud Keychain
Otherwise, these concerns of control have existed for nearly a decade with Sign in with Google[3]. Now they're making it more secure by not having a third-party as the actual broker between the user and the service provider, they just assist in the UX department.
However you have articulated the single biggest problem with this, and that is you are not in control of this thing.
I'm activity not tying anything to a cloud identity, ever. And I'm not having multiple devices or multiple cloud identities for when Google's et. al. automated AI type system decides I'm not getting access to my stuff.
It seems to me a centralised single point of weakness open to exploitation from the multi national corps.